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In this paper I examine dynamic tax competition in the context of an endogenous market 
structure.  I therefore consider the tensions between proximity versus concentration, taxation and 
firm mobility while I also consider strategic interaction by governments (to induce multinationality) 
and asymmetric firms (for market share).  The paper explores how strategic tax setting by rival 
governments may induce footloose firms to remain committed to initial location decisions, even 
when faced with adverse taxation regimes.  In this instance, sunk costs resulting from the 
operation of additional plants may confer a first mover advantage on governments that can 
prevent relocation of firms. 
   1 





This paper explores how strategic tax setting by rival governments may induce footloose firms to 
remain committed to initial location decisions, even when faced with adverse taxation regimes. In 
this instance, sunk costs resulting from the operation of additional plants may confer a first mover 
advantage on governments that can prevent relocation by firms. 
 
In the literature on multinationals, the emergence of multinational behaviour is often examined in 
the absence of government involvement and in the context of monopolistic competition or simple 
oligopoly models.  This literature focuses on the well-documented proximity versus concentration 
argument for multinationality, whereby multinationalism is associated with high transport costs 
and low plant-, as opposed to firm-specific fixed costs.
1  Other locational determinants of 
multinational activity such as market size, relative factor endowments and taxation (although to a 
lesser extent) have also been considered in the literature.  In order to focus on strategic 
interaction between governments, the tax competition literature often assumes that governments 
use taxation levels to compete for a single multinational firm.  Consequently, rarely have the two 
forces of government and firm strategic behaviour been examined simultaneously in a model of 
tax competition.  Furthermore, the scope for taxation when firms have alternative production 
strategies (exporting or multinationality) has also been ignored.  
 
The aim of this paper is to consider the roles of two types of non-cooperative agents 
(governments and firms) in determining multinational behaviour. It contributes to the tax 
competition literature by examining tax competition in the context of duopoly and, consequently, 
the role of strategic firm interaction.  In this model, competing firms respond to tax differentials by 
relocating production to the rival host country.  For governments, inducing multinationaIity as 
opposed to exporting behaviour offers rewards in terms of higher consumer surplus and positive 
tax revenues.  Therefore, I consider the extent to which governments can promote multinational 
behaviour while at the same time extract positive tax revenues. Tax competition among rival 
governments is characterised, justifiably so, by non-cooperative behaviour (as governments 
compete to induce multinational firms away from their competitor).  Therefore in this model, the 
tax rate is an endogenous variable and is the result of competitive behaviour amongst rival 
governments.  In this paper I therefore focus on the effects of firm mobility on the tax rate that is 
                                                       
1 See, for example Horstmann & Markusen (1992).   2 
set strategically by governments and its consequences for multinationality when firms are either 
symmetric or asymmetric.  
 
As previously mentioned, the literature on tax competition is dominated to a large extent, by 
models in which taxation is the only strategic variable, i.e. monopoly and often multinationality, 
characterises firm behaviour and government actions are the result of a duopoly game setting.  
Furthermore, as will be seen below, tax competition is usually characterised by non-cooperative 
behaviour.  Consequently, these models examine (tax) competition among countries for a single 
firm when it is faced with alternative location possibilities for production. 
 
Janeba (1998) examines the consequences of firm mobility on taxation in a third country model.
2  
Unusually he considers the duopoly case,
3 whereby one firm is located in the home country (the 
home firm) and the second firm (the foreign firm) is located in the foreign country.  Firms produce 
a homogenous good, which is sold for consumption in a third market.  The model is represented 
in a two-stage game.  In stage one, governments simultaneously choose tax rates and in the 
second stage, firms simultaneously choose outputs.  Governments are assumed to maximise net 
domestic surplus (or welfare) which is defined as the sum of producer surplus (of the domestic 
firm) plus tax revenues collected.  In the first scenario firms are immobile and as a result, taxation 
only affects domestic firms.  Thus here, Janeba adopts the basic set-up of strategic trade policy 
models.  Although he considers strategic behaviour, he does so using a third market model, 
which simplifies the analysis as firms meet in one market only (the third market) and strategic 
interaction and competition in domestic markets can be ignored.  Recall that in the strategic trade 
policy literature the role of the government is to confer a strategic advantage on the domestic firm 
(over the foreign firm).
4  Following on from the strategic trade policy literature, under conditions of 
firm immobility and Cournot competition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is characterised 
by negative taxes or subsidies.  When firms are mobile, the results of the analysis are quite 
different.  For example, because firms prefer higher subsidies (or lower taxes), they can now 
respond to tax/subsidy differentials by switching location, especially when the costs of changing 
location are low.  In the model, firms respond to tax differentials by shifting production 
(completely) to the more favourable location.  Anticipating firms’ output and location decisions, 
governments set taxes strategically.  In this model, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
a policy of laissez-faire or zero taxation (in each country).  The rationale is as follows.  If one 
country has a positive tax rate, the other can undercut.   If one country’s tax rate is negative, (i.e. 
                                                       
2 The term “third market model “ referred to in the text is due to Brander (1995), see also Brander & Spencer (1985). 
3 Although strategic interaction between firms is catered for, Janeba does not consider the tension between proximity 
versus concentration in determining multinational activity.  Although firms can centralise production in either of two 
locations, the basic set-up of Brander & Spencer’s (1985) model is retained i.e. firms serve the third market via exports 
only, the possibility of direct investment is not explored.   3 
a subsidy), the other country could overcut it slightly in order to let the other country pay the 
subsidies for both firms.   Finally, if the tax rate of one country is zero, the optimal response of the 
other country is to levy a zero tax rate also.  Therefore, in this game, governments will be 
indifferent to the location decision of firms, since tax revenue is always zero.  Thus, rather than 
focusing on tax competition to induce mobile firms into local markets, Janeba uses the 
assumption of firm mobility to modify the basic strategic trade policy prediction that optimal 
subsidies are positive. 
 
More basic models of tax competition involving (tax) competition for a single mobile firm have 
been extended to consider the role of capacity choice and country size.  In a later paper (2000), 
Janeba considers a multinational monopolist firm who can produce for the world from two 
alternative countries.  The game set-up is as follows.   Ex ante, the firm makes an investment in 
capacity in each of the two countries.  This is followed by a round of tax competition, in which 
each government chooses a tax rate (on output), which is followed by Cournot competition, in 
which firms choose outputs.  Without full commitment, and owing to the standard time-
inconsistency problem, governments would like to set a confiscatory tax ex post.  If there were 
only one country, firms realising this ex ante would make no investment.  However with two 
countries, the firm invests in both countries to gain leverage ex post.  Therefore, excess capacity 
induces tax competition for capacity utilisation among governments and helps overcome the lack 
of government commitment.  The game is solved as follows. 
 
In the final stage of the game, the firm chooses output given capacity costs are sunk and given 
the output decision has no impact on taxation policy.  When tax rates are equal, the firm utilises 
all capacity (unless total capacity exceeds unit demand – i.e. unless there is excess capacity).  If 
taxes differ, the firm first utilises its capacity in the country with the lower tax and production in the 
high tax country is equal to the minimum of the residual demand and available capacity in that 
country.  Output from any single plant is zero if plant capacity is zero or the tax rate in that 
country exceeds 100%.  In the second stage, governments choose their tax rates, taking into 
account how taxation policy affects the output decision of the firm.  When capacity is less than 
one, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which taxes in each country are equal 
to 100%, and the government appropriates the entire rent.  When capacity is greater than one, 
there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies but a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies does 
exist.  When capacity is equal to one, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which 
taxes in both countries are zero and the firm obtains the entire rent.  The first stage of the game 
addresses capacity choice, i.e. does the firm in equilibrium invest in excess capacity?  If the firm 
enters both countries, then it chooses identical capacity levels in both countries and holds excess 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 In the Strategic Trade Policy literature, the domestic government transferred its’ first mover advantage into an   4 
capacity.  This occurs for sufficiently small capacity costs.  If capacity costs are sufficiently high, 
then the firm does not invest at all and entry does not take place.  Thus the Nash equilibrium is 
discontinuous in the cost of capacity, i.e. the firm either over-invests or doesn’t invest at all, it 
never holds capacity equal to one.    
 
Therefore, when capacity costs are small, (tax) competition leads to tax rates that are low enough 
to justify the initial investment in excess capacity.  The converse is also true. Therefore in this 
model, it is investment in excess capacity, which is similar to the threat of firms relocating 
production, that induces tax competition.  
 
Haufler and Wooton (1998), examine tax competition between two countries of unequal size in an 
effort to induce multinational behaviour by a monopoly firm.  The firm will be indifferent between 
alternative production locations if profits from locating in either country are equal.  Owing to 
differences in country size, the firm is willing to pay a tax “premium” for locating in the bigger 
country.  In other words, the optimal tax rate of the larger country can exceed that of the smaller 
country and still leave firms indifferent between the alternative production locations. 
 
In these models, the choice of locating production in an alternative rival country poses a threat to 
host governments, whose aim is to maximise welfare via tax revenues.  However, there also 
exists the possibility that firms may choose to export to the region in which the active government 
lies.  This limits further the taxing power of authorities.  Keeping this in mind, I examine tax 
competition when firms have two strategies of serving a foreign market: exporting and direct 
investment (becoming multinational).  Unlike the models above, multinationality and monopoly 
are not assumed.  I therefore consider the tensions between proximity and concentration, taxation 
and firm mobility, while I also consider strategic interaction by governments (to induce 
multinationality) and firms (for market share).  In the models above, taxation influences patterns 
of multinational behaviour.  Future taxation levels must accordingly, influence patterns of 
multinationality also.  These features of taxation and multinational behaviour are presented here 
in an infinitely repeated game of tax and Cournot competition. 
 
In section 1.2, I present the basic assumptions and set-up of the model, while in addition I explore 
the mechanics of a “one-shot” version of the game.  Owing to the infinite time horizon of the 
game, in section 1.3 I consider the possibility of collusion between both agents.  In section 1.4, I 
present the analysis for a “reference” or “base” game.  The purpose of this game is to introduce 
the idea of dynamics, focusing on infinite repetition of the game in the absence of firm 
heterogeneity and government involvement.  In section 1.5, I consider the active role of 
                                                                                                                                                              
advantage for the domestic firm.   5 
government in the form of taxation policy.  In section 1.6, I extend the previous analysis to 
consider infinite repetition and firm heterogeneity, while in section 1.7, I present the analysis for 
the full model – tax competition with asymmetric firms in an infinitely repeated game. The final 
section of the paper presents some concluding remarks.   
 
 
1.2  The Basic Model   
 
The basic set-up of the model is as follows.  Consider two firms who compete for market share in 
a third market.  Firm 1 (located in Country 1) and Firm 2 (located in Country 2) each produce a 
homogenous good.  Production of the good is characterised by constant marginal cost, 
determined by two parameters c and λ .  Whereas c is the average variable cost component, 
common to both firms, λ  measures the dispersion around variable cost.  For simplicity, we shall 
assume that λ  is positive, conferring on a definite cost advantage of Firm 1 over Firm 2.  The 









c λ +                                                             (2) 
without loss of generality 
0 λ ≥                                                                   (3) 
 
Each firm must choose a method of meeting demand in the third market, which is not being met 
by indigenous industry.  The firms have two basic options available to them.  Firms can export the 
good from the domestic country to the foreign/third market, or alternatively, they can serve the 
market via local production by becoming multinational.  Firms who choose to be multinational can 
do so in either of two locations within the foreign region.  Transport costs (t) are exogenous and 
must be paid on each unit of a good exported from the domestic countries to the foreign market.  
On the other hand, multinational firms must incur a fixed cost G, representing the cost of 
establishing an additional plant in the foreign location.  This fixed cost is identical between 
alternative production sites.  As a result, each firm’s cost function is independent of its own and 
its rival’s location decision.  Hence as we will see later, each firm’s location decision depends on 
tax differentials only. 
 
   6 
Although (within the foreign market) there exist two alternative production sites (or countries), 
firms serve an integrated market.
5  The foreign region has the following linear inverse demand: 
 
12 1 pq q =− −                                                              (4) 
 
where  1 q  is the output supplied by Firm 1 and  2 q  is the output supplied by Firm 2.  
 
The governments of the two potential production locations a and b, levy a pure profit tax on profits 
arising from production within their jurisdiction.  It therefore impacts only on those firms who 
choose to be multinational.  The prevailing tax rate is the result of a tax competition game 
between two governments.  Full commitment to the announced tax rate is assumed.  Consumers 
are distributed evenly between the two potential production locations.  Therefore, each 
government seeks to maximise a social welfare function consisting of the sum of an equal share 
of consumer surplus plus any tax revenue. 
 
Firms choose their site of production to take advantage of tax differentials and respond to tax 
differentials by locating or relocating production completely to the more favourable location.   
Governments anticipate the firms’ location (and output) decisions and set taxes strategically.   
Firms choose their location after taxes have been set (since it is the aim of policy to attract 
multinational firms).  The structure of each time period of the game is as follows: 
 
Stage 1: Governments simultaneously choose tax rates 
Stage 2: Firms simultaneously choose their location of production (domestic or foreign) 
Stage 3: Firms simultaneously choose outputs  
 
Non-cooperation by both governments and firms who meet each period in an infinitely repeated 
game is assumed.   
 
Both agents (governments and firms) are forward looking and therefore must take into account 
further stages of the game when choosing their strategy.  For example, when choosing taxation 
levels, governments must consider how it will affect the output and strategy choice of firms.   
Similarly for firms, when choosing their strategy choice, they must take into account taxation 
policy of governments.  With (infinite) repetition of the game, forward looking agents must also 
look to future periods of the game when choosing strategies.  For example when firms are 
choosing between the strategies of exporting or multinationalism, they must take into account not 
                                                       
5 One could perhaps imagine the set up as being two firms, for example a US and a Japanese firm, serving the EU from   7 
only current taxation levels but also future taxation levels.  In dynamic games, each agent can 
determine his behaviour or strategy choice at any period of the game as a function of the entire 
history of the game up until that point.  Owing to the dynamic nature of the game, each firm must 
choose a strategy in order to maximise the present value of the stream of future expected profits.  
Assuming firms are somewhat impatient, the value of future profits will be discounted at a 
constant and positive rate denoted d.   
 
The dynamic problem facing the agents cannot be solved without consideration of the relocation 
decision of firms.  That is, since the model is dynamic, there exists the possibility that firms can 
revise previous investment decisions and possibly relocate production from one period to the 
next, as firm-mobility is also assumed.  Similarly, there exists the possibility that governments can 
revise previous taxation decisions.  Firms do not, however reverse strategy choices (exporting or 
multinationalism) from one period to the next.  That is, firms choose their strategy choice in the 
first period of the game by comparison of the stream of profits associated with the alternative 
strategy options.  If a firm deems multinationalsim an unprofitable option in this period, for 
example due to large sunk costs (even though these costs may be spread over an infinite number 
of periods), there is no reason to assume that multinationalism will become a profitable option in 
subsequent time periods of the game.  A similar argument holds for the exporting strategy option.  
Thus strategy choices (exporting or being multinational) in the first period of the game are 
irreversible, plant location decisions however are not.  The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(Nash for short) of the game can be characterised using backward induction.  
 
As a preliminary step, it may be worthwhile to consider a simplified one-shot version of the game 
to exemplify the mechanics of the model.  It must be noted however, that the remainder of this 
section repeats the material in section 3.3 of chapter three, and may be skipped if desired.  To 
illustrate firms’ choice of output in the last stage, consider a situation in which each firm operates 
a plant in country i, where i = a, b and where the tax rate is ai.  Firm 1 and 2 then solve the 
following maximisation problems: 
 








  −− − − + −    
                               (5) 
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  −− − − − −    
                               (6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
either Ireland or Portugal (assuming that they are multinational).   8 
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  =− − + −  
  







i cG πτ λ
  =− − − −  
  
                                           (8) 
 
Each firm’s location decision in stage two of the game is based on a comparison of after-tax 
profits associated with the various alternative production strategies and location choices.  Other 
possible production strategies include an exporting duopoly, Firm 1 a multinational and Firm 2 an 
exporter (and vice versa), a multinational monopoly or an exporting monopoly.  The associated 
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ct ct πλ πλ   =− + − =− − −  
                              (9) 
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92 92
i ct G c t πτ λ π λ
   =− − + + − = − − −   
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                     (10) 
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92 92
i ct c t G πλ π τ λ
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    
             (11) 
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ii cG cG πτ λ πτ λ
    =− − + − =− − − −    
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        (12) 
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 
                           (13) 
 
In stage one, governments set taxes strategically.  Each government chooses its taxation policy 
to maximise social welfare, taking as given the policy choice of the other country and taking into   9 
account how its strategy will influence each firm’s location and output choices.   The utility (social 
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      =− +− + + − − −           
                (14) 
 
The first term is the country’s share of consumer surplus,
6 whereas the second term represents 
tax revenue. 
 
As can be seen from this last equation, the government’s best tax policy would be to levy its 
maximum tax rate ( i τ =1).  However, at this tax rate the rival government would be encouraged to 
set a lower tax rate to induce multinational behaviour in their country.  This process of 
undercutting behaviour would repeat itself until countries can undercut no further.  This occurs 
when taxes are zero in both countries.  Subsidies are not optimal, as there would be no gain in 
consumer surplus,
7 while tax revenues would be negative.  Thus with this Bertrand type result, 
the expression for social welfare would be reduced to that of consumer surplus only.  The 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria would be that of the one-shot game with taxation as illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
The Nash equilibrium outcomes for a given parameterisation are depicted in Figure 1 below.  The 
equilibrium outcomes have the following representation: MM – two-plant duopoly; EE – export-
duopoly; ME/EM - has Firm 1 (2) choosing to be multinational while Firm 1 (2) is an exporter; 
MO/OM – two-plant monopoly.  Simply put, the strategy of exporting is denoted by “E” while “M” 
denotes the strategy of multinationalism.
8  The strategy representing a firm’s choice not to serve 
the market in question is shown by an entry of “O”.  The figure is generated by considering the 
various discounted profit boundaries for which firms are indifferent between alternative production 
strategies, when the game begins.  For example, the boundary between the regions MM and 
EM/ME, gives the combinations of G, t for which Firm 1 and Firm 2 are indifferent between one-
plant and two-plant production (provided that the other firm is multinational) for the entire game.    
 
For ease of interpretation, it may be convenient to divide the two-dimensional space of Figure 1 
according to three main cost thresholds. 
                                                       
6 It is assumed that each country maximises over an equal share of consumer surplus, thus setting α i=1/2. 
7 Since if the firm located in the rival country, this government would still maximise over the same consumer surplus.  This 
result is due to the integrated market structure of the third market. 
8 The various multinational configurations are non-unique with respect to location decisions, i.e. with zero taxation, firms 
are indifferent between locating in country a or b.  For simplicity we shall assume that, when indifferent between locations, 
multinationals locate together in country a.   10 
(a) Low  transport  costs: At or below a cost level of t=(1-c)/2,
9 each firm chooses between the 
strategies of exporting or becoming multinational.  For sufficiently low levels of G,
10 it is 
profitable for each firm to be multinational and we obtain the outcome MM, a two-plant 
duopoly or dual multinationalism.  As G increases the multinational option becomes less and 
less attractive.  Firstly, fixed costs reach a level such that it is feasible only for one firm to be 
multinational which leads us to the equilibria EM/ME.
11  Further increases in G induce both 
firms to opt out of the multinational option altogether and the EE equilibrium results.
12 
(b) Intermediate transport costs: For intermediate cost levels, and for sufficiently low levels of 
G,
13 both firms choose to be multinational.  Beyond this critical value of G, multinationality is 
profitable for one firm only if the other firm opts out of the market.  At higher levels of G,
14 the 
EE equilibrium emerges, as firms prefer to incur intermediate levels of transport costs than 
high fixed costs. 
(c)  High transport costs: At or beyond a cost level equal to t=1-c,
15 firms must choose to either 
serve the market by being multinational or to remain out of the market.  Again, for sufficiently 
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17 the 
multinational monopoly MO/OM are the Nash equilibrium outcomes.  Firms opt out of the 

















                                                       
9 The derivation of this condition on t can be found in Appendix A.4, equation (43). 




Gc t  −−  p [See equation (44), Appendix A.4]. 
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Gc  −  f .  [See equation (45), Appendix A.4]. 
13 That is, 
2 1
(1 ) 9 Gc  −  p .  [See equation (47), Appendix A.4]. 
14  That is, 
1 22 51 0 5 8 8 4 36 Gc c t c t t −++ −−   f [See equation (49), Appendix A.4]. 
15 The derivation of this condition on t can be found in Appendix A.4, equation (46). 















Figure 1:   
Equilibria with homogenous firms 
 
 
The Bertrand result for taxation policy also holds for the other multinational plant configurations 
mentioned above.  Consideration of the levels of social welfare in each equilibria illustrates the 
incentives for governments to attract multinational activity in the foreign region.  For example, 







ii Uc t α  =− −  
                                                 (15) 
 
Comparing equation (14) with equation (15), one can see that the governments have two 
motivations for inducing multinational activity.  Firstly, multinational behaviour is associated with 
higher consumer surplus for the region.  This result is independent of the firms’ preferential 
location choice.  Secondly, multinational activity generates (potential) tax revenues for the country 
in which firms choose to locate in. 
 
The Nash equilibrium is considerably different when one considers repetition of the game.  Now 
governments can revise taxation levels each period in the same way that firms can revise location 
decisions each period.  As a result, when firms choose their strategy in the first period, they must 
take into account not only current taxation levels, but also taxation levels in subsequent periods.  
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These issues are addressed in the remainder of the paper.  Firstly, one must consider whether a 
non-cooperative equilibria will obtain in an infinitely repeated game.  This is examined in the 
following section. 
 
1.3  Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games 
 
Infinite repetition brings about one more consideration, that is, the possibility of collusive 
behaviour.  Although non-cooperative behaviour between agents, both firms and governments 
respectively has been assumed so far, the Folk Theorem
18 suggests that infinitely repeated 
games often facilitates collusive equilibrium outcomes.  Infinite repetition may bring about 
additional equilibria as players can support desirable outcomes with threats to punish cheating by 
playing the non-cooperative Nash equilibria outcome.  Therefore we must next examine the 
possibility that firms and governments choose between competitive and collusive behaviour.  I 
assume that collusion between firms is tacit, as collusion in the form of explicit agreements is 
illegal.  For firms, collusion involves the lowering of industry output below the Cournot level.  More 
specifically, each firm produces one-half of the monopoly output to keep industry prices and 
profits higher than the non-cooperative outcome.  In this instance I assume collusion may be 
sustained by a grim/trigger punishment strategy.  Here, each firm initially chooses the collusive 
output and maintains this output as long as the other firm chooses this output, otherwise it 
chooses the Cournot output and continues to do so in all subsequent periods of the game.  Thus 
defecting from the initial agreement triggers a punishment in the form of lower profits to time 
infinity.  We must therefore examine the circumstances under which this strategy may or may not 
be sustained. 
 
For ease of understanding, I shall assume initially that firms invest in the same way, i.e. firms are 
either both exporters or both multinationals.  In addition, I also exclude any exogenous cost 
discrepancies between firms (λ =0).  For exporters, the payoffs if they collude (cooperate) or cheat 
are given by equations (65) and (66) in section A.5 of the Appendix.  Cooperation is an 
equilibrium phenomenon as long as the gains from cheating today are less that the benefits of 
continued cooperation in the future.  It can be shown that for a discount factor of d > 9/17, 
collusion yields at least as high a level of discounted profit as cheating.  Instead, if both firms 
invest abroad, i.e. become multinational, the collusive and cheating profits are given by equations 
(67) and (68).  Again, collusion is sustainable for a discount factor of d > 9/17.   
 
For firms with asymmetric costs, derived from either investment strategies or exogenous factors, 
collusion is harder to sustain.  For example, keeping the assumption of homogeneity between   13 
firms, if either firm invests abroad while the other firm remains an exporter, the multinational firm 
will require a higher discount rate in order to commit to a strategy of collusion.  The exporter on 
the other hand is willing to collude at a lower discount rate (See diagrams in Appendix A.5).  
Since both firms need to be in agreement before collusion can occur, it is the higher discount rate 
that matters.  Heterogeneity in the form of asymmetric variable costs again poses problems for 
collusion.  For example, simulations show that heterogeneous multinational firms may collude 
only for discount factors in excess of one. Thus tacit collusion is most easily sustained when firms 
are symmetric.  In this instance it may be ruled out by assuming a discount factor below the 
critical value of d < 9/17.  This assumption is adopted in the analysis that follows.  
 
The method of collusion between governments of the two host countries is less clear cut.   
Hypothetically, the collusive agreement would involve one government permitting the other to 
maintain a tax level beyond that set by optimality.  The opposing government would have to 
maintain a less attractive tax rate and refrain from undercutting the rate set by the other 
government.  Side-payments would disperse the gains from collusion equally between 
governments.  To keep the analysis simple, I assume a system of side-payments between 




1.4  Equilibria in an Infinitely Repeated Game: Symmetric Firms and no       
Taxation 
 
In this section, I solve a simplified version of the infinitely repeated game by assuming symmetry 
between firms and a policy of laissez-faire by governments.  These assumptions permit one to 
ignore (for the moment) the role of the asymmetry parameter λ , while at the same time ignoring 
the possibility of taxation.  This game will be used as a reference point for subsequent versions of 
the game.  It is useful in itself as it conveys to the reader, the consequences of game-repetition 
for the firm’s choice of strategy, compared to that of the one-shot game of the previous section.  
Therefore, this version of the game should make explicit, the tension between two key 
parameters of the model G and t and their interaction over time in determining the equilibrium 
market structure and the emergence of multinational behaviour.   
 
The game is solved in the usual way by backward induction.  In addition, without government 
involvement each period of the game reduces to two stages: 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 For a comprehensive discussion of the Folk Theorem see Tirole (1993).   14 
Stage 1: Firms simultaneously choose their location of production (domestic or foreign) 
Stage 2: Firms simultaneously choose outputs 
 
Thus, we first must obtain equilibrium outputs and hence prices and profits for each firm under 
every conceivable combination of the firms’ stage one choice.  The profit expressions for these 
outcomes can be found in section A.2 of the Appendix.  Having ultimately solved the second 
stage of the game, one must turn to the optimal first stage strategy of each firm, given the 
strategy of the other firm.  The equilibrium solution concept is Nash, where each firm makes an 
optimal choice given it has correct beliefs regarding its opponents choice.  However the game is 
repeated and there is infinite interaction between firms in choosing strategies.  Firms face each 
other in the third market, over an infinite number of time periods.  So, each firm must decide upon 
its strategy in order to maximise the present value of the stream of future profits it can expect to 
accrue.  Profits are discounted and the discount factor is represented by d.  Provided that this 
rate is positive (>0), with repetition, the profitability of pursuing each strategy is now increased.  
Furthermore, firms who choose to be multinational can now spread the associated sunk costs 
over an infinite number of time periods.  To illustrate these two points we will refer to the 
beginning of the game, or the period when firms choose their strategy of serving the foreign 
market, as time period 0, or t0.  In this time period, firms choose their strategy taking into account 
the stream of future profits.  Thus all firms will discount profits beyond this time period whereby 
multinational firms will incur a sunk cost in this period and not subsequently.     
 
It is perhaps worthwhile to note that when firms choose their strategy (export/multinationality) they 
do so by consideration of future and present profits arising from that strategy choice.   
Consequently, when a firm chooses a particular strategy, it is the strategy they pursue from 
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Although similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 is dynamic, and shows the profitability between the 
alternative production strategies over an infinite, as opposed to a single time period.
 19  That is, in 
this game, firms choose strategies to maximise the present value of the stream of future profits 
that it can expect to accrue.  Compared to a one-shot game, in an infinitely repeated game the 
strategy of multinationalism is more profitable relative to the strategy of exporting.  As previously 
mentioned, multinational firms must incur the additional sunk cost of being multinational in time 
period t0 only.  As a consequence multinational firms enjoy even higher profits in all subsequent 
periods.  Exporters on the other hand must incur transport costs in each period and thus has 
lower outputs and hence market share.  This feature of the infinitely repeated game can be seen 
when one compares the one-shot with the infinitely repeated game.  This comparison is featured 
in Figure 3 below.  
 
One can see that for the given discount rate, the scale of the infinitely repeated game is twice that 
of the one-shot version.  Furthermore, the spaces hosting the (multinational) outcomes i.e. MM; 
ME/EM; MO/OM, double in size.  In essence, with game repetition, multinationality is now 
profitable for higher fixed cost levels, this is true for every given level of of t.  As a consequence, 
the regions hosting the outcomes EE and OO both contract.  Thus not only is time encouraging 
multinational as opposed to exporting behaviour, but in addition, it also increases the possibility 
that the market will be served.  These results become even more exaggerated the more 
































Equilibria in a one-shot and in an infinitely repeated game (d=0.5) 
 
 
In summary, this infinitely repeated game with symmetric firms generates the following symmetric 
equilibrium outcomes: MM; EE; OO.  Asymmetric outcomes, namely: ME/EM and MO/OM
20 
obtain for particular G,t levels and represent the presence of the fixed cost parameter.  In a 
particular range of G, the market, over an infinite number of time periods can at most support one 
multinational.  Provided transport costs are below the critical value of t < (1-c)/2 we obtain the 
outcomes ME or EM.  Beyond this critical value (and assuming that the other firm is multinational) 
the exporting option disappears and the outcome OM or MO emerges.  Overall, Figure 2 displays 
the following pattern: increases in t bring about the emergence of multinationalism whereas 
increases in G make the exporting option more popular.  For sufficiently high levels of both t and 
G, firms do not serve the market and the OO outcome obtains in equilibrium.  Alternatively, dual 
multi-plant production arises when fixed costs are small relative to transport cost.  For 
intermediate values of fixed costs and transport costs, the asymmetric equilibrium ME or EM 
arises.  Finally, when transport costs are large relative to fixed costs, the multinational monopoly 
structure becomes dominant.  These results are analogous to that of Horstmann and Markusen 
(1992) and supports the tension between the two key parameters, G and t, namely fixed and 
transport cost, in determining individual firm plant configuration type.
21  The results do however 
                                                                                                                                                              
19 Note that for a discount factor of 0.5, the scale of the infinitely repeated game exactly doubles compared to that of the 
one-shot game. 
20 The determination of which outcome will emerge as an equilibrium outcome, i.e. either EM or ME, MO or OM is beyond 
the scope of this model. 












(1-c)/2  1-c   17 
extend their analysis in that here, firms’ strategy choices depend on a stream of, as opposed to 
“once-off” profits.  The results show that with repetition, and for a given discount rate, 
multinational firms obtain a strategic advantage over exporters, with time conferring positive 
future profits, which are independent of the fixed costs associated with being multinational. 
 
 
1.5  Equilibria in an Infinitely Repeated Game: Symmetric firms and  
           Taxation 
 
Keeping the assumption of symmetry between firms, this section analyses the extent to which 
taxation affects multinational activity.  That is, in this model, each government places a profit tax 
on total profits arising from production within their jurisdiction. As a consequence, it becomes 
effective only if the firms from Country I and 2 become multinational.  Similarly, it can be avoided 
by choosing the alternative exporting strategy.  Thus the following analysis will concentrate on the 
extent to which strategic taxation policy will prohibit/promote multinational activity.  Recall, in this 
model, each government’s incentive to induce multinational activity in their country arises from 
the gain of higher consumer surplus and (potentially) positive tax revenues.  With strategic 
interaction between governments and with repetition of the game, the implications of taxation are 
not as straight forward as in a one-shot game.  Consider the following.  In this model, each 
government will bid against the other to induce multinational behaviour in their country.  In time 
period t0, this will result in zero tax rates as governments undercut each other in an attempt to 
gain a competitive advantage.  Thus we obtain a variation of the well-known Bertrand result.  With 
zero taxation (in each location) within the third market, each firm must choose its configuration 
type as before, by consideration of the two key parameters of the model, G and t (exhibiting the 
tension between the alternative production strategies).  For various combinations of G, t, we 
obtain different representations of multinational behaviour.  As can be seen from the one-shot 
game (with zero tax rates), for very low fixed cost levels the equilibrium MM results, for 
intermediate fixed cost levels and for low t values, the equilibrium EM/ME results.  Similarly, for 
intermediate levels of G and t, the equilibrium MO/OM results.  These various configurations of 
multinational behaviour are non-unique with regard to location decisions, i.e. under zero taxation; 
firms have no preferences for locating in country a or b.  For simplicity, we assume that owing to 
factors outside this model, one country “wins” multinational activity, we shall assume that this is 
County a.  However, these plant configuration types are by no means the equilibria of the game, 
for they are the results of strategic firm behaviour in a static or once-off game, whereas in this 
model, the subgame perfect Nash equilibria is obtained by considering also, the future stream of 
profits.  However, they are nonetheless, the equilibria results for time period t0.   18 
The game is played again in time period t1 (and indeed all subsequent time periods), and again, 
governments will choose tax rates.  Those firms who have previously located production in the 
third market will also have the option of relocating production to the other host country (if needs 
be).  The mechanism is as follows.  In this second time period, the government who previously 
won multinationals, (Country a) will attempt to increases taxation levels.  They do so in an attempt 
to extract positive tax revenues.  Governments are aware of how taxation will effect the outputs 
and profits of firms, and must set a non-prohibitive tax rate.  By this I refer to a rate of taxation 
that will not induce firms to relocate out of their country.  Their optimal tax policy would be to set a 
tax that leaves firms indifferent between enduring the additional tax burden and incurring 
relocation costs (G
R, which is equivalent to G) associated with setting up a production plant in the 
other country.  Thus the government of Country a will set the profit tax in accordance to relocation 
costs.  For example, if relocation costs (G
R) are zero, firms (located in Country a) faced with the 
prospect of taxation hikes, can costlessly relocate production to Country b.  Consequently, the 
government of country a who wishes to maintain a multinational presence must set a zero tax 
rate. As the cost burden of relocation increases, the government of Country a can exploit firms, 
increasingly so, by a levying a positive tax.  Thus, in this model the optimal tax rate is set in 
accordance to relocation costs and in equilibrium, the optimal tax rate (τ *) is set equal to the fixed 
cost (G
R) of relocation.  
 
For the government of Country b, it must undercut the government of Country a by the full 
amount if it wishes to induce multinational behaviour in their country.  If Country a maintains a 
taxation level within the limits set by optimality, it will never loose multinational firms, and its 
taxation policy will promote multinational behaviour in that country.  The argument also holds if 
Country b was initially the “winner”.  The profit functions, taking into consideration this setting of 
tax rates, appear as equations (31) to (42) in section A.3 of the Appendix. 
 
We can now turn to the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with 
taxation.  Firms, in period t0, choose their strategy choice by considering the stream of profits 
under the alternative production regimes.   Due to the way the “winner” sets taxation, i.e. by 
levying taxes that just offset relocation costs, it is as though firms are incurring G each period.  
Thus the equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with an endogenous tax rate is that of the one-




















Figure 4:   
Equilibria in an infinitely repeated game with homogenous firms and taxation  
 
 
The impact of taxation becomes more apparent if one considers, once again, Figure 3.  We can 
now interpret the broken lines as the boundary lines for the infinitely repeated game with taxation.  
With taxation and for the given discount rate, the space in which the multinational outcomes MM; 
MO/OM; ME/EM previously occupied is now reduced, or more precisely, halved.  On the other 
hand, the region EE and OO expand with taxation.  Thus, with multinationality being less 
attractive than before, firms now opt for the exporting option of serving the foreign region.   
Furthermore, taxation also means that it is now more likely that the market will not be served at 
all.   
 
 
1.6  Equilibria in an Infinitely Repeated Game: Asymmetric Firms and        
           no Taxation   
 
Reverting to the assumption of laissez-faire, I now introduce and consider the role of the 
parameter λ . Recall, λ  is a variable cost parameter that measures that cost discrepancy between 
the two firms.  Positive values of λ  place firm 1 at a cost advantage whereas negative values of λ  
place firm 2 at a cost advantage.  Again, I limit the analysis to consider positive values only, 
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ME/EM   20 
With asymmetry, the regions corresponding to the various equilibrium regimes will undoubtedly 
alter in the G,t space.  Furthermore, it will also be responsible for the emergence of new regions 
corresponding to asymmetric equilibria, namely MO/EM, MO and EO. In addition, one must also 
consider the dynamics of this game compared to that of the simplified one-shot version of the 
game.  In this instance, the game is repeated (infinitely).  As was the case with the symmetry 
game, dynamics impact on multinational firms in a different manner to exporting firms.  For 
instance, to pursue the strategy of multinationality, firms must incur a once-off sunk cost in time 
period t0, and not subsequently.  Firms, who choose a strategy of exporting, must incur a per-unit 
transport cost, each period from t0 to infinity.  Thus dynamics (in the form of infinite repetition) 
favours multinational firms over exporters.  However, time favours efficient firms more, this can be 
seen from the diagram below.  Not only do the multinational regions expand at the consequence 
of exporting regions (hence giving all multinational firms more opportunity), but the regions in 
which the efficient firms have gained a monopoly (MO) or multinationality (ME) have expanded 
also.  I proceed by dividing the G,t space of Figure 5 according to the following threshold values 
referred to as t1*-t4* in equations (50) to (53) of the Appendix. 
 
 







 , each firm chooses between the strategies of 
exporting or becoming multinational.  For sufficiently low levels of G
22, it is profitable for both 
firms to engage in multinational behaviour and the equilibrium outcome MM obtains in 
equilibrium.  With cost asymmetry, increases in G mean that the cost inefficient firm finds it 
increasingly difficult to absorb the fixed cost associated with becoming multinational.  As a 
result, for fixed costs immediately beyond the initial value for G,
23 the equilibrium outcome 
ME is dominant.  There also exists a small region, within the region corresponding to the ME 
outcome,
24 where both firms find it profitable to be multinational provided that the rival firm is 
not (i.e. the rival firm will be an exporter in this region).  It may be worth noting that the 
following regions corresponding to multinational behaviour, EM/ME and MM have contracted 
in comparison to the symmetric case (Figure 1).  In addition we witness the emergence of a 
new region, namely ME.  That is, firm one who is faced with a cost advantage is now in a 
better position to absorb the fixed costs of opening an additional plant.  Firm two, on the other 
hand, being at a cost disadvantage, is now less willing to become multinational.   
Furthermore, Firm 2 finds it increasingly difficult to be an exporter competing with a cost-
                                                       








λ  −− −  − 
p [See equation (54) in section A.4 of the Appendix.] 








λ  −− −  − 
f [See equation (54) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 

















λ  −−  − 
p [See equations (55) and (56) in section A.4 of the Appendix].   21 
efficient multinational.  For sufficiently high fixed cost levels,
25 both firms choose to be 
exporters and the equilibrium outcome EE results. 
 











c λ  −+ 

 each firm chooses between the 
strategies of exporting or becoming multinational.  However, it is now no longer profitable for 
Firm 2 (as an exporter) to compete with Firm 1 (as a multinational).  As a result, in this region 
the equilibrium outcome ME disappears and is replaced by the equilibrium outcome MO.  For 
sufficiently low levels of G,
26 both firms choose the multinational option and the dual-plant 
duopoly MM emerges in equilibrium.  Beyond this value of G, the market can at most support 
one multinational firm.  Initially this opportunity is afforded to Firm 1 and the multinational 
monopoly outcome MO emerges.  As fixed costs increase,
27 Firm 2 will enter as a 
multinational only if Firm 1 chooses the exporting option.  Otherwise it opts out of the market 
altogether.  This brings us to the region EM/MO in the figure below.  Further increases in 
fixed cost G
28 leads to Firm 1 choosing to enter the market as a multinational.  Since Firm 2 
cannot compete (profitably) with a multinational in this region, the outcome MO obtains in 
equilibrium.  As fixed costs increase further,
29 both firms can enter the market as exporters 
and the exporting duopoly emerges again in equilibrium. 
 




c λ  −+ 





c λ −− , both firms choose between the 
strategy of exporting and becoming multinational.  It emerges that in a particular range of G, it 
is only profitable for a firm to be multinational only if the rival firm opts out of the market.  For 
sufficiently low levels of G
30 the dual-plant duopoly emerges again.  Beyond this value of G, it 
is profitable for Firm 1 to stay multinational in this region; on the other hand, Firm 2 cannot 
compete with a multinational in this region and opts out of the market leading to the MO 
outcome.  For higher levels of G,
31 it is profitable for either of the two firms to become 
multinational, provided that the rival firm opts out.  In other words, the market can at most 
                                                       








λ  −+  − 
f [See equation (57) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
26 That is,  ()
2 1 3
1 18 1 2
Gc d λ

−−  − 
p [See equation (58) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 








λ  −+ −  − 
f [See equation (55) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 








λ  −−  − 
p [See equation (56) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
29 That is,  () () 22 2 1
20 40 32 12 20 32 16 12 48 27 144 1 Gc t c c t t c t d λλ λ λ −+−+ − − + + − − f [See equation (59) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
30 See Footnote 26.  
31 That is,  ()
2 1 3
1 18 1 2
Gc d λ

−+  − 
f [See equation (60) in section A.4 of the Appendix].   22 
support one multinational firm.  As fixed costs increase further,
32 this possibility is no longer 
feasible for Firm 2 and the equilibrium MO results.  For sufficiently high levels of G,
33 neither 
firm finds a dual-plant strategy profitable and the exporting duopoly outcome EE results in 
equilibrium. 
 









c λ −+ , Firm 1 chooses between the strategies of exporting and becoming multinational.  
Firm 2 however, no longer finds exporting a profitable strategy.  It must therefore incur the 
fixed cost associated with a dual-plant structure if it wishes to enter the market.  For low 
levels of G,
34 the dual-plant duopoly emerges and the MM outcome emerges in equilibrium.  
Beyond this fixed cost level, Firm 1 chooses to remain multinational.  Firm 2 cannot compete 
with a multinational in this region and so the equilibrium MO results.  As fixed costs continue 
to increase,
35 the market can once again, support one multinational, either Firm 1 or Firm 2 
and the region MO/OM persits in the equilibrium space.  Further increases in G
36 make it 
unprofitable for the inefficient firm to remain in the market and Firm 1 enjoys a multinational 
monopoly while as fixed costs increase further,
37 Firm 1 enjoys an exporting monopoly and 
the region EO emerges for the first time. 
 
(e)  t > t4*: In this final region, where t4* = 
1
1 2 c λ −+ , the exporting strategy is no longer profitable 
for either firm.  Consequently, each firm chooses either to be multinational or to remain out of 
the market.  Again, for sufficiently low fixed cost levels,
38 the dual-plant duopoly MM 
emerges.  As G increases Firm 1 persits with the strategy of multinationalism and as a 
consequence Firm 2 opts out of the market and we obtain the region MO.  For higher fixed 
cost levels,
39 Firm 2 finds it profitable to compete with Firm 1 for the multinational monopoly, 
which moves us into the region MO/OM.  Further increases in G drive the inefficient firm out 
of the market leaving Firm 1 to enjoy a multinational monopoly. Finally, as G increases 
                                                       
32 That is,  () () 22 2 1
20 40 32 12 20 32 16 12 48 27 144 1 Gc t c c t t c t d λλ λ λ −+++ − − − − − − f [See equation (61) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
33 See Footnote 29. 
34 See Footnote 26. 
35 See Footnote 31. 
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f [See equation (62) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
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f [See equation (63) in section A.4 of the Appendix]. 
38 See Footnote 26. 
39 See Footnote 31.   23 
further,





















Equilibria in an infinitely repeated asymmetric game without taxation (d=0.5) 
 
 
Figure 6 compares the infinitely repeated game with that of the once off.  The broken lines of 
Figure 6 represent the boundary lines from the one-shot version of the game.  Again, for the 
given discount rate, the scale of the infinitely repeated game doubles compared to that of the 
one-shot game.  As a result the regions hosting the (multinational) outcomes MM; ME; EM/ME; 
EM/MO; MO/OM; MO double in size.  As a consequence, the outcomes EE; EO; OO, all contract.  
Thus the possibility of spreading fixed costs over an infinite number of time periods encourages 
both types of firms to be multinational as opposed to exporters, as firms are now willing to be 
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1.7  Equilibria in an Infinitely Repeated game: Asymmetric Firms & 
Taxation 
 
In this section, I analyse the equilibria of the full game i.e. tax competition for heterogeneous 
firms.  These equilibrium outcomes are summarised in Figure 7 below.  Recall once more, that 
each government’s incentive to induce multinationality as opposed to exporting behaviour stems 
from the attempt of governments to claim higher consumer surpluses and positive tax revenues.  
Despite the introduction of firm heterogeneity, the analysis of taxation with strategic government 
behaviour is similar to that of section 1.4.  Thus, in a one-shot version of the game, we would 
expect that bidding by governments would result in a zero tax rate, in both countries – the 
previously mentioned Bertrand result.  Indeed, this is how the optimal tax rate is chosen in the 
first stage of the game, time period t0.  With zero tax rates, the high and low-cost firms must 
choose their plant configuration type by consideration of profits under the alternative strategies of 
serving the third market.  Firm 1, having a definite cost advantage over Firm 2, is better able to 
serve the foreign market locally, by being multinational.  The converse is also true.  Again, for 
















t   25 
representations of multinational behaviour; MM; EM/ME; ME; EM/MO; MO; MO/OM, are non-
unique with respect to location decisions, but again for simplicity, we shall assume firms who 
choose to be multinational do so in country a.  However, these location decisions are by no 
means the equilibria of the full game, for the game is played an infinite number of times.  Thus, a 
firm’s strategy choice will be based on future as well as present profits. 
 
We must therefore consider what happens when the game is played in period t1 (and subsequent 
time periods).  The government of country a, who obtained multinationals in t0 knows that firms 
are to some degree “tied” to country a.  By this I mean that firms have chosen to incur the fixed 
cost G there and will be therefore reluctant to relocate production and in effect, re-incur G.  This 
feature of the model provides the government of country a the opportunity to levy a punitive tax 
rate on multinational firms.  As in section 1.4, governments must set a non-prohibitive tax rate 
that leaves firms indifferent between incurring the additional tax burden and relocating production.  
The government of country a must keep taxation within this boundary if it is to maintain the 
multinational presence.  On the other hand, the government of country b must undercut the 
government of country a by the full amount if it wishes to induce multinational behaviour away 
from county a into country b.  Provided the government of country a maintains taxation levels 
within the boundaries set by optimality, it will never lose multinational firms and its taxation regime 
will continue to promote multinational activity in their country.  
 
Because governments set taxes to just offset relocation costs (τ *=G
R), it is as though firms are 
incurring G each period.  Thus the equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with taxation (see 
Figure 7) is that of a one-shot game without taxation.  Therefore to compare the before and after 
taxation equilibria of the infinitely repeated case, one can use as a guide, Figure 6.  The results 
are as follows.  As one might expect, taxation discourages multinational activity with the regions 
hosting multinational outcomes; MM; EM/ME; EM/MO; MO; MO/OM halving is size.  As a 
consequence exporting, as a means of serving the foreign market is now relatively more 
attainable.  This can be seen as the regions EE and EO increase.  The region OO increases as 
for given levels of G and t, exporters and now multinationals find this method of serving the 
market unprofitable.  It is perhaps interesting to note that since the relocation burden (G=G
R) is 
identical between asymmetric firms, there is no discrimination of the tax burden between cost-
efficient and cost-inefficient firms.  Indeed, the burden of taxation (τ *=G
R) is the same for all 
multinational firms, whether the firm is cost-efficient or cost-inefficient, or whether it is a 
multinational monopolist or duopolist.  Thus, asymmetry holds no role in tax-setting. 
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1.8 Conclusion   
 
This paper analyses tax competition in the context of imperfect competition when firms are mobile 
and have alternative methods of serving markets.  Tax competition is motivated by rivalry 
between governments to attract multinational firms in order to extract higher consumer surplus 
and (potentially) positive tax revenues.  However, firms respond to tax differentials by relocating 
production (completely) to the rival country.  The analysis suggests that multinational firms who 
initially choose a particular location for production, will remain committed to that location when 
faced with the possibility of relocation provided taxation in the initial location remains “non-
prohibitive”.  In addition, the “non-prohibitive” taxation level is identical between heterogeneous 
firms.  Beyond this taxation level, locations that previously won multinationals will lose 
multinational firms to their rival as multinational firms relocate production.  Thus, although 
intertemporal time commitment is not assumed, it is as though firms, in the first period, are 
committing to actions is the second (and indeed all subsequent) time period(s). 
 
Extensions include the introduction of location specific fixed costs.  Here, the location of 
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cost environment.  This may be a way of introducing country- as opposed to firm-specific 
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Appendix  
 
The Appendix is arranged as follows.  The first section, section A.1, is a guide to how equilibrium 
outputs and profits are solved for in a one-shot Cournot game.  The next section, section A.2, 
introduces dynamics and gives the profit expressions of an infinitely repeated Cournot game.  
Section A.3 presents the profit expressions for the full game – asymmetry in an infinitely repeated 
game with endogenous taxation.  Section A.4, should act as an accompaniment to the diagrams 
presented throughout the body of the text.  More specifically, it shows how the various critical 
values and boundary lines were solved for in the symmetric and asymmetric games with infinite 





In Cournot duopoly models, each firm maximises profit over output, given the output of the other 
firm.  In these models, there exits the following standard expression for equilibrium profit: 
 
2 **   ii i qG π =−                                                         (16)  
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The parameters c1 and c2 represent variable costs for Firm 1 and 2 respectively, they are defined 
as follows: 
1
   if an exporter
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In addition, there exist fixed or sunk costs associated with opening an additional plant: 
 
    if multinational







                                               (20) 
The resulting equilibrium profit expressions are: 
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cG πλ  =− + − 
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where access and fixed costs are defined as above.  The expressions for profit are as follows: 
 
 







cG πλ  =− + − 

                                             (30) 
 







cG πλ  =− − − 

                                            (31) 
 







ct πλ  =− + − 

                                            (32) 
 







ct πλ  =− − − 

                                            (33) 
 
A.2 
When games are repeated, firms have the potential to earn positive profits now and in all 
subsequent periods in which the game is played.  To obtain profits in an infinitely repeated game, 
one must add current profits to the future profits firms can expect to accrue until time infinity.  All 
future profits must be discounted; d denotes the discount factor rate.  Whereas the cost structure 
for exporters remains unchanged from one period to the next, multinational firms incur a once-off 
fixed cost at the beginning of the game and not subsequently.   31 
 
Profits in an infinitely repeated game 
 









πλ  =− + −  − 









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                          (35) 










πλ  =− + −  − 









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                        (37) 
 










πλ  =− + + −  − 









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                         (39) 
 










πλ  =− + −  − 









πλ  =− − + −  − 
                                     (41) 
 










πλ  =− + −  − 
                                      (42) 









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                      (43) 









πλ  =− + −  − 
                                       (44) 
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πλ  =− − −  − 





Governments tax firms up until the point where firms are indifferent between enduring the tax 
burden and relocating production i.e., τ *=GR.  For multinational firms, profits depend positively on 
the difference between the sunk cost G and the relocation cost GR, i.e. the lower is relocation 
costs relative to the initial fixed cost, the lower is taxation in the host country and the higher is 
profit/gain from being multinational. 
 
Profits in an infinitely repeated game with taxation 
 









πλ  =− + −  − 









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                       (47) 












  =− + − + −   −−   












  =− − − + −   −−   
                       (49) 









ct G G G
dd
πλ
  =− + + − + −   −−   









πλ  =− − −  − 
                                    (51) 










πλ  =− + −  − 









ct G G G
dd
πλ
  =− − + − + −   −−   
                   (53) 
 













  =− + − + −   −−   
                     (54) 












  =− − − + −   −−   
                    (55) 









πλ  =− + −  − 
                                  (56) 
 









πλ  =− − −  − 





Solving for critical values 
 
(a)  To solve for the value of t beyond which profit from the market structure EM/ME is negative, 
set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profit arising from the market structure EM (ME) equal to zero and 








=−                                                           (58) 
 
(b) To solve for the value of G which makes a multinational firm indifferent between multi- and 
single plant production, given the other firm is multinational, set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profits for 







Gc t =− −                                                       (59) 
 
(c)  To solve for the value of G which makes a multinational firm indifferent between multi- and 
single plant production, given the other firm is an exporter, set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profit from   34 








Gc =−                                                          (60) 
(d)  To solve for the value of t beyond which profit from the market structure EE is negative, set 




=−                                                               (61) 
 
(e) To solve for the value of G at which a multinational is indifferent between serving and not 
serving the market, given the other firm is multinational, set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profit from the 






Gc =−                                                          (62) 
(f)  To solve for the value of G which makes a multinational indifferent between serving and not 
serving the market, given the other firm is not serving the market, set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profit 







Gc =−                                                       (63) 
 
(g)  To solve for the value of G which makes a firm indifferent between a multinational monopoly 
and an exporting duopoly, set Firm 1’s (Firm 2’s) profit from the market structure MO (OM) 




51 0 5 8 8 4
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Gc c t c t t =− + + − −                                    (64) 
 
 
(h)  To solve for the value of t beyond which Firm 2’s profit arising from the market structure ME 





c t λ  =− − 

                                                (65) 
 
(i)  To solve for the value of t beyond which Firm1’s profit arising from the market structure EM is 
negative, set Firms 1’s profit from the market structure EM equal to zero and solve for t: 




c t λ  =− + 

                                                     (66) 
 
(j)  To solve for the value of t beyond which Firm 2’s profit from an exporting duopoly is negative, 





c t λ =−−                                                        (67) 
 
(k) To solve for the value of t beyond which Firm 1’s profit from an exporting monopoly is 





c t λ =−+                                                       (68) 
 
(l)  To solve for the value of G which Firm 2 is indifferent between multi- and single plant 
production, given Firm 1 is multinational, set Firm 2’s profit form the market structure MM 









λ  =− − −  − 
                                           (69) 
 
(m) To solve for the value of G at which Firm 1 is indifferent between multi- and single plant 
production, given Firm 2 is multinational, set Firm 1’s profit from the market structure MM 









λ  =− + −  − 
                                          (70) 
 
(n) To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 2 indifferent between multi- and single plant 
production, given  Firm 1 is an exporter, set Firm 2’s profit from the market structure EM 









λ  =− −  − 
                                           (71) 
 
(o) To solve for the value of G at which Firm 1 is indifferent between multi- and single plant 
production, given Firm 2 is and exporter, set Firm 1’s profit from the market structure ME 
equal to profit from the market structure EE and solve for G: 








λ  =− +  − 
                                           (72) 
 
(p)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 2 indifferent between being multinational and 
not serving the market, given Firm 1 is multinational, set Firm 2’s profit from the market 









λ  =− −  − 
                                        (73) 
 
(q)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 1 indifferent between an exporting duopoly and 
a multinational monopoly, set Firm 1’s profit from the market structure MO equal to profit from 




20 40 32 12 20 32 16 12 48 27
144 1
Gc t c c t t c t
d
λλ λ λ =− + − + − − + + −
−
   (74) 
 
(r)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 1 indifferent between being a multinational and 
not serving the market, given Firm 2 is multinational, set Firm 1’s profit from the market 








λ  =− +  − 
                                      (75) 
 
(s)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 2 indifferent between an exporting duopoly and 
a multinational monopoly, set Firm 2’s profit from the market structure OM equal to profit from 




20 40 32 12 20 32 16 12 48 27
144 1
Gc t c c t t c t
d
λλ λ λ =− + + + − − − − −
−
    (76) 
 
(t)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 2 indifferent between a multinational monopoly 
and not serving the market, given Firm 1 will serve the market, set Firm 2’s profit from the 








λ  =− −  − 
                                                (77) 
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(q)  To solve for the value of G which makes Firm 1 indifferent between a multinational monopoly 
and an exporting monopoly, set Firm 1’s profit from the market structure MO equal to profit 









λ  =− + −  − 
                                         (78) 
 
(r)  To solve for the value of G at which Firm 1 is indifferent between a multinational monopoly 
and not serving the market, given Firm 2 does not serve the market, set Firm 1’s profit from 









λ  =− +  − 





This section considers the possibility of collusion between firms. 
 
Both firms export 
 










                                                (80) 
Given that the other firm is producing the collusive output, a firm’s best response under a strategy 
of cheating is to produce a higher output.  If a firm defects, the other firm switches from playing 
the collusive output to the Nash equilibrium output level, resulting in all future profits for both firms 










π =− − + − −
−
                                    (81) 
Firms will co-operate as long as the gains from cheating today are less that the benefits of 
continued co-operation in the future.  By equating equations (65) and (66) and solving for d, it can 
be shown that for a discount factor of d > 9/17, collusion yields at least as high a level of 
discounted profit as cheating. 
   38 
 
Both firms multinational 
 










                                                   (82) 
Given that the other firm is producing the collusive output, a firm’s best response under a strategy 
of cheating is to produce a higher output.  If a firm defects, the other firm switches from playing 
the collusive output to the Nash equilibrium output level, resulting in all future profits for both firms 










π =− − + −
−
                                        (83) 
Again, firms will co-operate as long as the gains from cheating today are less that the benefits of 
continued co-operation in the future.  By equating equations (67) and (68) and solving for d, it can 
be shown that for a discount factor of d > 9/17, collusion yields at least as high a level of 
discounted profit as cheating. 
 
One firm is multinational, the other firm is an exporter  
 
With collusion, each firm produces half the monopoly output, discounted profits (under the 






















                                                 (85) 
Given that the other firm is producing the collusive output, a firm’s best response under a strategy 
of cheating is to produce a higher output.  If a firm defects, the other firm switches from playing 
the collusive output to the Nash equilibrium output level, resulting in all future profits for both firms 










π =− + − + − +
−










π =− −+ − −
−
                                 (87)   39 
Firms will co-operate as long as the gains from cheating today are less that the benefits of 
continued co-operation in the future.  By equating equations (69) and (71) and equations (70) and 
(72) we can solve for the discount factors above which collusion yields at least as high a level of 





















Firm 1 multinational, 
Firm 2 is an exporter 
Firm 1 is an exporter, 
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